There is an interesting point of law in this tragedy. The new GM did not assume liability for claims arising from incidents or accidents occurring before July 2009 as part of its bankruptcy re-organization. “Our principle throughout this process has been to the put the customer first,” GM told me, “and that will continue to guide us.” The implication is that GM will negotiate settlements.
The Center for Auto Safety, aka CAS, claims that based on its analysis of NHTSA’s Fatal Analysis Reporting System (FARS) that 303 deaths of front-seat occupants occurred where the airbag failed to deploy in crashes of GM’s now recalled 2005-07 Cobalt and 2003-07 Ion small cars. The search did not include the other five models recalled, so the number of deaths without airbag deployment would have been higher, CAS claims.
These explosive allegations from an organization that is funded by product liability lawyers is the latest negative development in the ongoing GM ignition switch controversy, which has seen GM first deny a safety defect existed,mthen issue a recall as well as an apology, and then expand the recall to cover more cars.
GM immediately fought back against CAS. “As knowledgeable observers know, FARS tracks raw data. Without rigorous analysis, it is pure speculation to attempt to draw any meaningful conclusions,” Greg Martin of GM told AutoInformed.
“In contrast, research is underway at GM and the investigation of the ignition switch recall and the impact of the defective switch is ongoing. While this is happening, we are doing all we can now to ensure our customers’ safety and peace of mind. We want our customers to know that today’s GM is committed to fixing this problem in a manner that earns their trust,” Martin said.
GM shares closed today at just over $34, down from a one-year high of more than $41. Since 12 February, the day before the first round of ignition-switch recalls was announced, GM is off ~4%.
Prior to the CAS charges, AutoInformed reported that a Delphi ignition switch used in 1.6 million small GM cars was associated with 31 frontal crashes and 13 fatalities. While the recalls were first announced last month, a recent New York Times report claims NHTSA has received a large number of complaints expressing safety concerns and describing these problems during the past 10 years.
CAS now claims that FARS data “clearly show front seat occupants were being killed in crashes where the airbags did not deploy as soon as the recalled vehicles hit the road, with three deaths in Saturn Ions during 2003 and 6 deaths in Chevrolet Cobalts in 2005. The number of front-seat occupant deaths steadily climbed as more Cobalts and Ions were sold, with 43 in 2009 and 47 in 2010 where the airbags did not deploy.”
CAS also blasted NHTSA, but no surprise not itself, charging that NHTSA “could and should have initiated a defect investigation to determine why airbags were not deploying in Cobalts and Ions in increasing numbers. As the agency has done in past investigations, special investigation teams should have been sent out to acquire more information on the crashes found in FARS and determine in which ones the airbag did not deploy due to the ignition key defect.”
This is piling on for profits is as cynical as it gets in our view. Next will come, predictably, a class action lawsuit for the loss in resale value for the affected vehicles, as was done in the Ford Explorer Firestone tire recall, which ultimately went nowhere.
In this safety matter, CAS cross-referenced the FARS cases with the EWR* death claims reported by GM to see which EWR cases had an airbag non-deployment. CAS looked at the crucial time period of 2004 up to 2007 when NHTSA conducted three SCIs [special crash investigations, which are anecdotal –editor] into two 2005 Cobalt and a 2004 Saturn Ion model. In that period, CAS found four Ion EWR death claim reports from GM and five Cobalt reports where the airbag did not deploy. In addition, there were two Cobalt cases where airbag deployment was unknown.
* [Manufacturers of motor vehicles, motor vehicle equipment, child safety systems, and tires are required to submit Early Warning Reporting or EWR information and documentation to NHTSA in order to comply with the Transportation Recall, Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation or TREAD act. Public or non-confidential manufacturer EWR data is accessible from the web site. Use the EWR Data Search pages to search for manufacturer EWR data associated with Production (for Light Vehicles only), Property Damage, and Death and Injury records – editor]
The uncertainty of cause clearly relates to the uncertainty of driver position in the design of the car. If you don’t know where the driver sits in the seat, you don’t know if the driver’s knee is even close to a keychain hanging with or without weight on the switch. This case tragically reveals the absence of the most important information in the design of interiors and the driver’s workstation–the driver sitting in the seat.
Currently, the digital models of the driver are all used to evaluate reach for a “sitting” model, with no seat or effects of the seat on driver position. Try sitting in different postures and look at what happens to your knee. When you slump, your knee moves forward and upward (if the foot is fixed). If you sit upright, your knee moves rearward and downward. Now, why isn’t this information considered important enough to be used in car design.
GM is the auto company caught in the light of tragedy that faces every car company in the world because they don’t have a driver sitting in the seat until the car is built. The seat is more than comfort. It is part of the driver’s workstation. Now convince me that this is not part of the investigation by GM and NHTSA.
Weight hanging on GM ignition switches was a common-knowledge problem since the introduction of a new style key switch in the early Sixties. I’ve replaced a few. To think the same issue is causing trouble 50 years later is pretty bizarre.